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Abstract
In this paper we examine the gender gap in political affiliation that emerged during the 1980s and has remained
ever since. In that decade, for the first time since American women obtained the right to vote in 1920, they showed
a tendency to vote more Democratic than men. There have been two major explanations for this development: 1)
that women’s labor force participation increased dramatically during the 1970s and 2) that their chances of being
unmarried did as well. We examine these explanations using General Social Survey data collected between1972
and 2018. We also explore two explanations that involve changes in men’s lives: 1) that men are (of course) also less
likely to be married themselves than they were before 1970; and 2) that men have left unions in greater numbers
than women. We speculate that these last two changes have led to men’s greater likelihood of declaring themselves
Republican. We find support for all four explanations.
Keywords: gender gap in political affiliation, marital decline, women’s labor force participation, de-unionization
Introduction
When American women obtained the vote in 1920,
many people expected that a women’s voting bloc
would alter the shape of politics in the future. However,
for the next 60 years, women voted similarly to their
male relatives. In 1980, a gender gap in voting did
emerge when the Republican presidential candidate,
Ronald Reagan, received 54% of men’s votes and only
46% of women’s (Abzug & Kelber 1984). Women are
now significantly more likely to vote for Democratic
candidates than are men. In the last five presidential
elections, a majority of women voted for the Democratic
presidential candidate, while a majority of men voted
for the Republican candidate. In the 2016 election, 54
percent of women voted for Clinton, while 52 percent of
men voted for Trump (e.g., Bump 2018).
Polls have shown that men and women tend to have
different views of government’s roles. For example, over
the years, men have proven to be substantially more
supportive of U. S. government war efforts than women.

In contrast, women have been more supportive of
government programs that provide public services and,
particularly, safety nets for those in trouble than have
men (e.g., Kenschaft & Clark 2016: 256-7.)
The question that drives our analysis in this paper
is why the gender gap in political preference emerged
in the 1980s and why it persists today. Our review of
the relevant literature indicates that two major largescale changes have been identified, both of which have
expanded women’s opportunities and responsibilities.
These changes are 1) the enormous increase, since
1970, in women’s labor-force participation and 2) the
equally enormous increase in women living outside of
marriage. We also theorize that the decline of unions
and the greater likelihood of both women and men
living outside of marriage have played a role, especially
in distancing of men from the Democratic Party. We
test the relative contribution of each of these changes to
the gender gap in political preference using a data set not
commonly analyzed in examining that gap. The General
Social Survey (GSS) data we use allows us to examine
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changes in the gender gap in political affiliation at more (Inglehart & Norris 2000) like Section 8, Medicare,
frequent intervals than does presidential election data. school breakfast and lunch programs, and more (Welch
& Hibbing 1992). For these several reasons, we speculate
Labor Force Participation
that women’s participation in the workforce will be
associated with increases in the political gender gap.
The first explanation for the gender gap in voting
involves women’s labor force participation. Since the Women’s Experience of Marital Decline
1970s, there has been a tremendous increase in female
participation in the workforce, an increase that we
Other explanations for the gender gap in political
capture, in one way, in Figure 1. The percentage of preference-- its emergence and its longevity have
women working full time almost doubled (from 25% to focused on the rise of divorce rates, delayed marriage
46.4%) between 1972 and 1994 and has remained nearly and unmarried motherhood. These factors have left
at this level ever since. We prefer to use the percentage many women as single parents fending alone to care
of women working full time in this paper, over the more for their children and family members who are elderly,
conventional measure of the percentage of women in sick, or disabled. Data on the likelihood that women
the labor force, since it is a truer indicator, in our view, and men live in marital relationships are shown in
of women’s financial independence from men. (See Figure 2 (in Appendix A.) Figure 2 presents changes
Figure 1 in Appendix A.)
over time in the percentage of General Social Survey
Women’s labor force participation, the theory goes, respondents who reported being married by survey
affects their involvement in politics in several ways. year. Specifically, in 1974, 74.8% of women reported
One has to do with reference groups. At work, women being married, while only 48.7% of them did so in 2016.
are exposed to other women’s views about politics. It (See Figure 2 in Appendix A.)
is typical for women to talk about political campaigns,
Women’s declining chances of being married, an
candidates, and government policies (Manza & Brooks effect of both increased divorce rates and later age at
1998). Hearing other women’s beliefs about politics is marriage (Stritof 2019), has increased their chances
likely to influence the way women think about these of having a Democratic affiliation for several reasons.
ideas. When women don’t work, they do not have as Perhaps most important, marriage creates partnerships
much opportunity to talk about topics like politics in which women perceive their self-interests being
with other women because their domain is more likely linked to men and, generally, in which they receive
to be confined to their homes. As a result, they are resource transfers from men “in exchange for access to
more likely to subscribe to the political views of their children” (Edlund & Pande 2002:923). Married couples
marital (or other) partner. Participation in the labor are also more likely to have a greater financial security
force serves as a source of political socialization and than single people. Financial stability translates into
expands the knowledge of its occupants. For women, being more likely to lean Republican (Wilson & Lusztig
this is especially likely to lead to their greater political 2004:980).
involvement.
Non-marriage, on the other hand, can lead women
In addition, employment introduces women to a to see their fate as linked to those of other women
new set of roles. Holding a job opens questions about (Stout, Kretschmer & Ruppaner 2017). In general, the
appropriate gender roles, questions that some women Democratic Party, more so than the Republican Party,
will not have previously faced. It reinforces a sense of is viewed as supporting programs that advance those
women’s ability. Employment inspires more feminist- “linked fates.” The Democratic Party, for example,
centered goals and increases women’s desire for political favors welfare programs and programs that help people
activism (Manza & Brooks 1998). This, in turn, may through tough times. Low-income single women
lead women to be more liberal and Democratic.
are apt to use such programs and lean towards the
Finally, working for pay may give women a sense of party that supports such programs (Edlund & Pande
financial independence because they do not have to 2002:925) and other single women are apt to see such
rely on their partners for money. In many instances, programs as positive, too. The Democratic Party also
however, women are paid less than men and the types supports other women’s issues, such as abortion/birth
of careers they pursue are limited to what are deemed control issues, equal pay for men and women, and
“women’s work.” This, in turn, increases their awareness efforts to limit sexual assaults (the #MeToo Movement).
of and support for governmental “safety net” programs Consequently, we hypothesize that, when women are
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unmarried, the political gender gap between them and
men will be larger.
De-Unionization
While the “labor force participation” and “women’s
experience of marital decline” explanations of the gender
gap in political affiliation speak to why women’s affiliation
may have begun to be independent of men’s in the 1980s
(and, perhaps, grown thereafter), these explanations do
not really speak to why men’s political affiliation did not
continue to parallel women’s political leanings. They
imply that both greater labor force participation and
lower marriage rates will have led women to hope for
government policies that are supportive of individuals,
and therefore lean Democratic. But why would not
men who experience lower marriage rates have become
more Democratic, too?
There have been certain societal trends, other than
the decline in marriage, which might have led men
to vote Democratic. Since the 1960s, the American
industrial economy has thinned, thanks in part both
to automation and to outsourcing. These factors have
deprived less-educated men of many relatively high-paying
manufacturing and construction jobs (e.g., Kenschaft
& Clark 2016:41-47). This de-industrialization, plus an
accompanying growth of income and wealth inequality
(e.g., Piketty & Saez 2003), might have led to a greater
allegiance of less-educated men to the Democratic Party,
the party traditionally less associated with the interests
of big business and more likely to pursue programs that
support the relatively powerless.
But recognition of, and action on behalf of, economic
and political interests requires organization. And there
is one notable modality for such organization that has
suffered enormously since the 1950s: unions. While
33.2% of American workers were unionized in 1955,
10.5% were unionized in 2018 (Bureau of Labor 2019 and
Meyer, 2004). As a consequence, the historic synergy
between working class people and the Democratic
Party, facilitated by union membership (e.g., McGarrity
2001), has been challenged. In fact, de-unionization
has contributed to working-class (maybe particularly
white working-class) disaffection from the established
political system (Milkman, 2018), leading to generally
lower voter turnout, perhaps especially among men
(Kenschaft & Clark 2016:258). Milkman (2018) argues
that the resentment that feelings of powerlessness create
has made working-class men especially receptive to
populist entreaties on the part of politicians from the
left or right. This variable can help explain the election
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of Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, in 2016.
There are several reasons to believe that deunionization may have led more men to become more
Republican than women. However, one does not really
have to go any further than to recognize that more men
than women have left unions since the 1970s. While 25%
of men had unionized jobs in 1983, only about 12% did
so in 2015. The comparable figures for women—14%
and 11%--indicate a much smaller decline (Center for
Economic and Policy Research 2016). We speculate
that loss of union ties, then, have made more men
than women susceptible to a Republican affiliation that
those ties might have hindered earlier. In any case, we
hypothesize that de-unionization will be associated
with an increase in the political gender gap.
Men’s Experience of Marital Decline
The flip side of the divorce (and delayed marriage)
revolution’s effect on women’s chances of affiliating with
the Democratic Party is its likely effect on men’s chances
of affiliating with the Republican Party. If marriage is
conceived of as exchanges of men’s economic resources
for “access to children” (Edlund & Pande 2002:923),
then a decline in marriage meant for many men
they could retain those economic resources, making
them wealthier and, hence, even more likely to side,
politically, with the political party (Republican) most
interested in protecting personal wealth. Moreover,
marriage tends to create a primary reference group
in the spouse not only for women, but also for men.
In fact, it is well known that men tend benefit more
from marriage than women, in terms of health gains
and other tangible indicators of their connection to a
spouse (e.g., Harvard Health Publishing 2019)—this,
largely because of their relationship to one significant
other, a wife. In the absence of a wife, however, men
may become less concerned about the “linked fate”
of all women, and therefore turn away from the party
(Democratic) that evinces the greater support for
women’s concerns. In short, we expect that as men’s
chances of being unmarried increased, the gender gap
in political affiliation will have increased.
Methods
We were interested in how the political leanings, and
not just the attitudes towards particular presidential
candidates, of men and women changed over time, and
particularly how they changed during the 1980s and
later. We aimed therefore to measure both the political
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affiliation of women and men at relative short (one- and
two-year) intervals and the aggregate political party
affiliation of men and women in each of the five decades
since 1970.
The General Social Survey (GSS) asks the question,
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself
as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what”?
in each of 31 national surveys since 1972 (the last,
as of this writing, in 2018). The responses are coded
into seven categories: strong Democrat; not strong
Democrat; Independent but near Democrat; Independent;
Independent but near Republican; not strong Republican;
and strong Republican. We combined the first three
response options into the broad category “Democrat,”
the last three into the broad category “Republican,” and
retained the Independent category separately. For the
first part of our analysis, we showed how the difference
between the percentage of females and males who
claimed to be Democrats changed in individual surveys
over time.
We then used the GSS question, “Last week were you
working full time, part time, going to school, keeping
house, or what?” to measure how women’s and men’s
work status has changed over the years since it was
first asked in the 1972 GSS. The eight response options
the GSS used for this variable are “working fulltime;”
“working part time;” “temporarily not working;”
“unemployed or laid off;” “retired;” “school;” “keeping
house;” and “other.” We recoded this variable into two
broad response options: “working fulltime” and “not
working fulltime.” For the second part of the analysis,
we showed how the percentages of females and males
who were working fulltime changed in individual
surveys over time.
The GSS also asks a question about marital status:
“Are you currently -- married, widowed, divorced,
separated, or have you never been married?” We
recoded this variable into two categories: “married” and
“not married.” The third part of our analysis involved
showing how the percentage of females and males who
were married varied over time.
In subsequent analyses, we examined differences in
male and female political affiliation by decade and then
used this greater number of aggregate cases to study the
effects of women’s employment and marital status on
those differences.
In our analysis, we looked at the relative strength of
association between the percentage of women “married”
and “working fulltime,” on one hand, and our measure
of the political gender gap (the percentage of women
with a Democratic affiliation minus the percentage
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of men with such an affiliation) over the 31 periods.
We then compared each of these associations with
the associations between the percentage of American
workers who were unionized (data from Bureau of
Labor 2019 and Meyer 2004) and the percentage of men
“married” and “working fulltime” and the gender gap.
Finally, we used stepwise regression to sort out which of
the independent variables had the greatest effect, over
time, on changes in the gender gap.
Results
Figure 3 in Appendix A shows the trend for our
measure of the gender gap in political preference: the
percentage of women claiming they are Democrats
minus the percentage of men who claim to be
Democrats. Throughout the 1970s, men and women
had a similar likelihood to claim Democratic affiliation,
despite a small peak in 1973. However, in the 1980s
women’s likelihood to claim being Democrats pulled
ahead. By 1989, the difference between women and
men stood at 8.5%.
In the 1990’s, the gap increased overall, although with
a few spikes. The first spike was in 1991. We believe this
spike is associated with the Gulf War which started in
1990 and ended in 1991. Surveys have shown that,
typically, men are more likely to support war than
women (e.g., Kenschaft & Clark 2016:255ff.) and, in
general, that the Republican Party has been more likely
to support war than the Democratic Party. Another
spike occurred in 1996, the year that the “Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act” was passed. President Clinton was pressured
into signing this act by a Congress that was a majority
Republican at the time, even though he had already
vetoed two other pieces of legislation that threatened the
safety net for poor families (Schafer 2017). We believe
that the spike in women’s support for the Democratic
Party is connected to the fact that women were sticking
by the party that generally fought against these welfare
reform programs. In 2010, Barack Obama signed the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) or “Obamacare.” The ACA
was aimed at helping families get the healthcare they
needed at a lower cost. This Democratic legislation was
much more popular among women than men; hence,
another spike in the political gender gap appeared in
2010. (See Figure 3 in Appendix A.)
Using all the General Social Surveys between 1970 and
1980 combined, Table 1 shows that, during the 1970s,
there was very little difference in women and men’s
political leanings. During this decade, 62.8% of males
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and 63.4% of females identified with the Democratic
Party. The gamma relating political preference and
gender was -.01, showing that females were not more
likely than males to lean Democratic during the 1970’s.
(See Table 1 in Appendix B.)
In Table 2 in Appendix B, we look at the 1980s, 1990s,
2000s, and 2010s. In the 80s, the relationship between
gender and political leanings starts to grow. 53.4% of
men reported leaning Democratic, while 58.5% of
women did so. The relationship grows even stronger
in 1990. Nearly 58% of females reported leaning
Democratic, while only 48.2% of men did so. In the
2000s and 2010s, the relationship had been established
and remained steady, showing women are more likely to
lean Democratic than men are in those decades as well.
(See Table 2 in Appendix B.)
We expected that women who were unmarried and
worked full time would be more likely to be Democrats
than either married women who did not work full time
or unmarried men who worked full time. Table 3 in
Appendix B looks at the combination effects of marriage
and labor force participation on party affiliation by
gender. The data in Table 3 show that males and females
who are married and do not work full time have similar
likelihoods of being Democrats in all decades under
examination. Specifically, 62.6% of such males were
Democrats in the 1970s, while 60.9% of such women
were. Table 3 also shows a similar relationship as time
progresses. By the 2010s, for example, 49.8% of men
who were married and did not work fulltime were
Democrats, while 48.2% of such women were.
Much more change was evident when we compared
men and women who were unmarried and worked full
time. Table 3 shows that in the 1970s, unmarried men
who worked full time were more likely to be Democrats
(69%) than comparable women (65.3%). However, this
was the last decade when such men were more likely to
be Democrats than were women who were unmarried
and worked full time. After the 1970s, unmarried
women who worked full time remained predominantly
Democratic. In the 1980s, 63.2% of unmarried women
who worked full time claimed to be Democrats as were
65.8% of such women in the 1990s, 67.6% in the 2000s,
and 67.4% in the 2010s. In every decade, unmarried
women who were working full time were substantially
more likely to lean Democratic than married who were
unmarried men did not work full time. (See Table 3 in
Appendix B.)
Although unmarried women who worked full time
retained a high likelihood of leaning Democratic over
the decades, unmarried men who worked full time
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became much less likely to do so. From the 1970s to
the 1980s, there was an 18% decrease in the tendency of
unmarried men who worked full time to say they leaned
Democratic. In the 1970s, 69% of such men claimed to
be Democrats. In the 1980s, that number plummeted
to 51%. In subsequent decades, the percentage of
unmarried men who worked full time and claimed to
be Democrats was static, remaining at just above 50% in
every decade. (See Table 3 in Appendix B.)
A possible explanation for the gender gap in party
affiliation is that the economic experiences of these
males and females are so different. Men who are
unmarried and work fulltime are much more likely
than comparable women to earn a decent income and
to live a more financially stable lifestyle. Such men are
more likely to align themselves with the party that
tends to be associated with protections for the wealthy:
The Republican Party. Divorced women, especially
those with children, typically need more help from the
government than do divorced men.
We observed that unmarried men who worked
fulltime, rather than comparable women, had political
leanings that changed dramatically after the 1970s. This
finding raises the question of whether the conventional
explanations of “women entering the labor force” and
“fewer women were married” for the political gender
gap are completely adequate. It seems that these
explanations cannot do complete justice to the changing
political attitudes of men. The data in Tables 4 and 5
help to address this question.
Table 4 in Appendix B shows the zero-order
correlations between our measure of the political
gender gap (the percentage of females claiming to
lean Democratic minus the percentage of men doing
so) over the 31 survey periods , with several variables,
measured at those survey periods, theorized to affect
change in the political gender gap. The percentage of
women working fulltime (r =.71) and percentage of
women married (-.73) have very strong correlations
with the gap and are in the directions predicted by
the “women entering the labor force” and the “fewer
women married” theses. The “percentage of American
workers in unions” has a slightly stronger correlation (r
=-.75) than either of these two variables and suggests
that men’s role in the creation of the gender gap may
be crucial because men were much more likely to have
belonged to unions than women. Finally, though, it is
the percentage of married men that has the strongest
correlation (r =-.77) with the gap of all the variables
we examined here. This correlation strengthens the
argument that understanding changes in men’s lives
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is very important if we want to fully understand the
emergence and maintenance of the gender gap in
political affiliation. This finding is consistent with our
previous speculation that remaining single or regaining
singleness likely increases men’s average wealth, while
it decreases women’s average wealth. It follows that
men, more than women, would express attachment to
the Republican rather than the Democratic party. (See
Table 4 in Appendix B.)
Table 5 in Appendix B presents a modest test of
which of the variables listed in Table 4 explain the
most variation in the rise of the gender gap in political
affiliation when others are controlled. Table 5 reports
on a stepwise regression involving all of those variables.
In the resulting model, two variables—the percentage
of men married and the percentage of women working
fulltime—make it into the equation. A beta of -.53
indicates that, as the percentage of men married
decreased, the gender gap increased, even with the
percentage of women working fulltime controlled. And
a beta of .32 indicates that as the percentage of women
working fulltime increased, the gender gap increased
as well, even with the percentage of men married
controlled. Together these two variables explain 61%
of the variance in the political gender gap over time
(adjusted r square =.61). (See Table 5 in Appendix B.)
One major equivocation needs to be emphasized
here: There are high degrees of inter-correlation among
all variables introduced in the model presented in Table
5, so this table should not be seen as eliminating any
of the theories that guided this analysis. One message
stands, however: If one wants to explain the emergence
of, and variation in, the political gender gap over the
last 50 years, one needs to take into account not only
what has happened to make women’s political leanings
independent of men’s, but also what has helped to make
men’s political leanings independent of women’s.
CONCLUSION
Our findings show considerable support for the
two mainstream explanations of the emergence and
maintenance of a gender gap in political preference in
the United States: 1) that it results from a combination
of women’s increased labor force participation and 2)
from women’s decreased likelihood of being married.
In fact, when we compare the political preferences of
married men and women who are not working full
time in each decade since the 1970s, we find there is
no statistically significant difference in political leaning
between the genders for any of those decades, even using
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very large samples. When we do the same comparison
of unmarried men and women who are working full
time, however, we find a significant and substantial gap
during the 1980s-- a gap that widens in later decades.
We suspect that this latter change has much to do with
working women developing relationships with other
women in the workplace, relationships that inspire
feminist consciousness and goals (e.g., Inglehart &
Norris 2000; Manza & Brooks 1998) and unmarried
women seeing their fates being linked to those of other
women (e.g., Stout, Kretchmer & Ruppaner 2017) and
less tied to those of particular men, their husbands (e.g.,
Edlund & Pande 2002).
Our analysis of the comparison involving unmarried
men and women who are working full time, however,
revealed that it was not women’s likelihood of claiming
Democratic-Party leanings that changed the most over
the decades. It was men’s leanings. In fact, while the
percentage of unmarried women, working full time,
who claimed Democratic affiliation hardly changed at all
over time, similar men’s likelihood of doing so dropped
considerably. This observation led us to consider that
the mainstream explanations for the gender gap in
political party affiliation might have over-emphasized
the importance of women’s growing independence and
under-emphasized men’s changing political affiliation.
We speculated that the decreased likelihood of men
declaring a Democratic Party affiliation might be
related to another notable trend in American society
since 1970: the fact that workers, and particularly male
workers, have become much less likely to have labor
union affiliations than they did in previous decades.
Using a correlation analysis involving 31 data points, we
found tentative support for this outcome. We theorize
that men’s detachment from unions may have involved a
similar detachment from the Democratic Party, thanks
in large part to the strong support of unions for that
party.
Finally, our stepwise regression involving men’s
declining chances of being married showed that this
variable, plus women’s increasing working status, were
the only variables that survived the cut even when the
variables of union membership and women’s chances of
being married were included. This slightly unexpected
finding underscores the main point of this paper:
that we may not completely understand the gender
gap in political affiliation unless we take seriously the
experiences of men as well as women. Men’s declining
chances of being married may mean that they have not
only been less likely to share mutual concerns with one
significant woman (a wife) who might have compelled
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an interest in the Democratic Party. Singleness may
also mean that men have been able to retain a greater
portion of their income and, consequently, have been
more likely to turn to the party that most aims to
protect high income earners and their property: The
Republican Party.
There are some notable limitations to this study. One
limitation is that, while certain variables like women’s
work status and men’s marital status may explain
general trends in the political gender gap, they will
never be enough to account for local variation in the
gender gap. Ever since polling on such issues has been
done, men have tended to have more positive attitudes
towards entering wars, and less positive attitudes
towards legislation supporting safety nets, than women
(e.g., Kenschaft & Clark 2016). Thus, we find that the
gender gap in political affiliation made short-term leaps
in 1991, during the first Gulf War, and in 1996 and 2010,
when the Welfare Reform Act and the Affordable Care
Act, respectively, were at issue. It is beyond the scope
of this, and probably any social science, paper to offer a
model that might predict such local variation.
Perhaps an even more significant limitation, however,
is imposed by the small number of data points available
to analyze and the high degree of inter-correlation that
exists among key variables. Thirty-one data points in
a time series analysis means that the tests of models
involving more than a small number of variables are
impossible. These tests are especially challenging
when key variables are as highly inter-related as they
are in our analysis. Most obvious, for our purposes, is
the necessarily high correlation of men’s and women’s
chances of being married over time. Clearly as one has
decreased since 1970 the other has decreased as well.
Consequently, we are suspicious of our finding that
men’s chances might be more useful for the explanation
of the emergence of the political gender gap than
women’s. That both variables are also highly correlated,
over time, with America’s de-unionization, calls into
question another suggested conclusion we made in
this paper: The role played by de-unionization in the
emergence of the gender gap in political affiliation.
Finally, we recognize that our analysis is plagued
by questions of sampling and measurement error.
The General Social Survey has generally aspired to,
and achieved, what is known as a multistage cluster
probability sample. But when all critical independent
variables are as similar in their strength of association
with the dependent variable (all here were associated
with the political gender gap at anywhere from .71
for the percentage of women working fulltime to -.77
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for percentage of men married), then sampling or
measurement errors in any of the variables can make a
substantial difference in the findings.
Nonetheless, this paper raises an important question
for future researchers to pursue: Is it almost as likely that
what has happened to men accounts for the emergence
and maintenance of the political gender gap as what has
happened to women?
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Appendix A
Figure 1. Percentage of Women and Men Working Full Time, 1972-2018

Source: General Social Survey, 2018

Figure 2. Percentage of Women and Men Reporting They were Married, 1972-2018

		

Source: General Social Survey, 2018
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Source: General Social Survey data, 1972-2018, via the CMS, Berkeley.
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Appendix B
Table 1. Gender and Political Party Identification, 1970-1980
				Males			Females
Democrat			62.8%			63.4%
				(3093)			(3538)
Republican			34.7%			34.6%
				(1707)			(1936)
Independent or Other		2.5%			2.0%
				(122)			(112)
				

N=10,506

Gamma= -.01		

p=.25

Source: General Social Survey data.

Table 2. Gender and Political Party Identification by Decade, 1981-2018

		
Decade		

% of Men
Who are
Democrats

% of Women
Who are
Democrats

N

Gamma

Significance
Level

1981-1990

53.4		

58.5		

12,456

-.10		

<.001

1991-2000

48.2		

57.8		

12,271

-.18		

<.001

2001-2010

50.1		

57.9		

11,319

-.14		

<.001

2011-2018

51.4		

59.3		

7,797

-.14		

<.001

Source: General Social Survey data.		
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Table 3. Gender and Political Party Affiliation for Sub-Samples of Respondents by Decade, 1970-2018
Sub-Samples
of Respondents
by Decade

% of Males

% of Females

N

Gamma

Significance
Level

1970-1980
Unmarried &
Working Full-time

69.0		

65.3		

1200

.09		

p=.02

Married & Not
Working
Full time

62.6		

60.9		

3971

.04		

p=.63

1981-1990
Unmarried &
Working Full time

51.0		

63.2		

2063

-.24		

p<.001

Married & Not
Working
Full time

57.9		

59.5		

3809

.07		

p=.23

1991-2000
Unmarried &
Working Full time

51.5		

65.8		

2587

-.29		

p<.001

Married & Not
Working Full time

54.4		

50.9		

3098

.07		

p=.12

2001-2010
Unmarried &
Working Full time

54.5		

67.6		

2319

-.25		

p<.001

Married & Not
Working Full time

50.4		

47.3		

2965

.06		

p=.32

2011-2018
Unmarried &
Working
Full time

55.5		

67.4		

1628

-.23		

p<.001

Married & Not
Working Full time

49.8		

48.2		

2090

.03		

p=.87
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Table 4. Correlations of Political Gender Gap with Other Variables Over 31 Survey Periods
					 Political Gender Gap (1)
Other Variables
Percentage of Women
Working Fulltime				

.71***

Percentage of Women
Married					 -.73***
Percentage of American
Workers in Unions				

-.75***

Unemployment rate				 -.31
Percentage of Men
Married					 -.77***
Notes: *** indicates significance at .001 level; (1) Political gender gap = percentage of women reporting they lean
Democratic minus percentage of men reporting they lean Democratic.
Table 5. Stepwise Regression of the Political Gender Gap on the Percentage of
Women Working Fulltime, the Percentage of Women Married, the Unemployment
Rate, the Percentage of American Workers in Unions, the Percentage of Men
Working Fulltime, and the Percentage of Men Married
Political Gender Gap (1)
Percentage of Men Married				

-.53**

Percentage of Women
Working Fulltime			

.32*

N						

31

Adjusted R square					 .61
Notes: We excluded variables with .10 entry criterion: Percentage of Women Married, Unemployment Rate, Percentage of American Workers in Unions and Percentage of Men Working Fulltime; * indicates significance at .10
level; **, at the .01 level.

